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HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND ETHICAL JUDGMENTS 
IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS 
by Alan Geyer 
Dr. Alan Geyer (United Methodist) is professor of political ethics and ecumenics at 
the Wesley Theological Seminary, Washington, DC. He received his B.A. at Ohio 
Wesleyan University and the S.T.B. and Ph.D. at Boston University. Formerly he was 
the editor of The Christian Century, the Dag Hammarskjold professor of peace 
studies at Colgate University, and executive director of the Churches' Center for 
Theology and Public Policy in Washington. He is the author of Christianity and the 
Superpowers: Religion, Politics, and History in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations (Abingdon, 
1 990) and many other publications and is a member of CAREE. This paper was 
presented at the American Society of Christian Ethics on January 20, 1 990. 
Any discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations today must, of course, begin in wide-eyed wonder 
at the absolutely stunning array of recent events in the erstwhile communist bloc. We have 
witnessed more sudden and more sweeping transformations of power relationships in more 
countries simultaneously than at any other moment in modern history -- at least in any 
period of relative peace. 
The vital involvement of Christian churches in every one of these transformations is more 
than enough reason for Christian ethicists to look deeply into the dynamics and meanings of 
these events. 
This paper will not attempt to account for these most recent developments.1 Before we 
move too quickly to the vainglorious claim that we Americans have won the Cold War, or still 
less to the pseudo-eschatological declaration of Francis Fukuyama that we have reached "the 
end of history," 2 we would do well to reflect on what that awful enmity has cost: in 
impoverishment and pain and death, especially among the world's poorest peoples and the 
milHons of have-nots in this country, the basic amenities or Soviet peoples, and the quality 
1Substantial material in this paper is taken from my forthcoming book, Christianity and the 
Superpowers: Religion. and History in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990) and 
is used by permission of the publisher. 
22Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest, August 1989. 
of life for all of us. Can any of us really doubt that this enmity should long have been a 
much higher priority on the vocational agenda of Christian ethics? 
A brief account of some of our professional liabilities may be in order. Most of us share 
in what John Stremlau of the Rockefeller Foundation has called the "dangerous and self­
inflicted ignorance" of our educational system concerning Russian studies. That ignorance 
is compounded by a severe asymmetry in historical seriousness. The Russians have a 
profound sense of things past; Americans do not. Most Americans have never been 
emotionally gripped by the fact that the Soviet people bore the heaviest burdens of World 
War II and were alone in fighting the main force of German armies on Russian soil for three 
years -- but the Russians remember, and many of them still believe that the Western allies 
wanted their whole nation to bleed to death. 
Whatever the deficiencies of our educational system in these matters, Christian ethics as 
a field has hardly been dominated by historical seriousness. In a 1972 essay, James Gustafson 
charged Christian ethicists with "a strong inclination to neglect history."3 I believe that 
neglect has tended to make us all the more vulnerable to some of the unfortunate tendencies 
of "Sovietology as a vocation," as Stephen F. Cohen has described it: a preoccupation with 
abstract totalitarian and monolithic models and a bent toward gross exaggeration of the 
influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology" on Soviet behavior. Such common (but not universal) 
traits of soviet studies, especially as the field developed in the Cold War context of the 1950s 
and 1960s, reinforced the relative neglect of history, nationalism, and culture in 
understanding the Soviet Union. 4 
Ethicists and other Christians concerned about issues of war and peace and the nuclear 
arms race have tended to be preoccupied with the abstractions of what George Kennan has 
called "military mathematics" (weapons numbers and specifications) and also with doctrinal 
disputes concerning deterrence and just-war theory -- rather than with the concrete 
historical realities of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. 
It was not until the 1980s that our mainline churches bean to get institutionally serious 
about education and exchange programs in Russian studies. It is still the case that Protestant 
and Roman Catholic theological education devotes only peripheral attention to Eastern 
3James M. Gustafson, "The Relevance of Historical Understanding," in Paul Deats, Jr. , Toward 
a Discipline of Social Ethics: Essays in Honor of Walter George Muelder (Boston: Boston University 
Press, 1972), 49. 
4Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 8-27. 
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Orthodoxy which has been the dominant historical influence on Russian nationhood and 
culture. 
Yet the Russian Orthodox Church remains the largest national church in the world and 
the largest member church in the World Council of Churches. It has experienced a "religious 
renaissance" since the 1970s that has especially flowered during the Millennia! celebrations 
and the glasnost of the past two years - - and is now blessed and burdened with opportunities 
for mission and education for which it is hardly prepared. 
This paper is essentially programmatic in suggesting the most appropriate topics of study 
and teaching by ethicists in the field of U.S.-Soviet relations. My undisciplined approach 
to Christian ethics tends to emphasize the moral burdens of history. Here I wish to highlight 
the irenic powers of a political e·thics of ambiguity: an ethics which knows that historic 
responsibilities for most international conflicts tend to be shared -- and also that there are 
gifts and graces on both sides of such conflicts. 
Such an approach, of course,. risks the reproach of certain nameless zealots who harangue 
us about the alleged sins of "moral equivalence" in U.S.-U.S.S.R. affairs. My sleazy meager 
ten-point outline does not presume to measure guilt arithmetically on either side of this 
enmity: it only proposes an agenda of morally signific.ant topics and offers some hypotheses 
about historic responsibility. 
I. The Moral Burdens of Russian History 
Soviet novelist Yuri Trifonov once wrote: "History is not simply something that was. 
History is with us and in us."55 Russian history -- both lived history and the legendary and 
fabrica·ted accounts of it -- is much with and in the Russian people. That history is a 
compound of deeply-rooted Christian identity, the harshness of nature, the brutality of 
invasion and despotism, revolts and revolutions, the inexhaustible flow of artistic and musical 
genius, and centuries of violence and incalculable unnatural death. Since 1914, just one long 
lifetime ago, perhaps seventy million Russians have perished in war, civil war, famine, 
· forced collectivization, purges and gulags -- by far the largest unnatural loss of life by any 
nation in modern history. The centrality of the Resurrection in Russian faith and worship 
testifies to the bitterness of his national experience. 
What we make of such a heavy history -- whether we imagine that Russians have a 
uniquely callous view of human life, or a uniquely precious view of it, or are absolutely 
determined to defend it in the name of Mother Russia -- is a question that ca.nnot be 
sensitively addressed without profound study and human encounter. But it is a question that 
can be answered in part by lifting up another feature of Russian history. 
5Yuri Trifonov, Literaturnoe obozrenie, No. 4, 1977 ,  101, quoted in Cohen, x. 
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2. The Special Russian Graces that Illumine the Moral Life 
Suzanne Massie's powerfully attractive 1980 book, Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of 
Old Russia, testifies to such special graces: 
The Russians know the darker side of humanity, but they also understand the 
extraordinary capacity of the human soul for sacrifice and love, and they have the 
ability to accept both sides of man with greater equanimity than we in the West. They 
know how to take a long view, something we have all but forgotten in our anxious 
desire for immediate gratification . . . .  They have approached God in a spirit of 
meekness; they have loved nature. . . . Their knowledge of suffering and their 
understanding of human weakness have made their 19th century novels probably the 
greatest in world literature. 6 
If Suzanne Massie's testimony is primarily to the artists and writers of pre-Revolutionary 
Russia, the unending flow of creativity since 1917 is no less remarkable, notwithstanding the 
harshness of "socialist realism" and political repression. The continuing power of poetry as 
a public art and the undisguised spirituality of contemporary novelists, even party members, 
continue to amaze non-Russian observers. In short, there are blessed treasures of humanism 
in the Russian mind and. spirit which command our wonder and awe. 
3. Our Lost History of Russian Relations Before 1917 
The magazine Soviet Life, aimed at American readers, has recently been full of 
references to early chapters in our shared history, going back to the 18th century. There was 
. •' , ,  ' 
' 
. 
indeed an extensive pattern of U.S.-Russian relations between the revolution of 1776 and the 
revolution of 1917 . In fact, almost every major happening in U.S. foreign policy in that 
period of nearly a century and a half was marked by at least an incidental element of 
Russian-American engagement. 
Catherine the Great gave rhetorical support to the American Revolution. Thomas 
Jefferson greatly admired and carried on an extensive correspondence with Tsar Alexander 
,1. Later Alexander offered to mediate an end to our War of 1812 with Britain. Still later he 
1.proposed that the U.S. join the Holy Alliance and become a European power. The definitive 
' 
. 
1, language of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 was in the context of Russian expansion down the 
West Coast as far as California. In the Civil War, Russian dispatched fleets to the harbors 
of New York and San Francisco, professing support for the Union against any British or 
French threat to intervene for the Confederacy. While Tsar Alexander II may have been 
motivated more by the desire to keep his ships from being bottled up in the Baltic Sea-by the 
British navy, President Lincoln had indeed appealed for Russian help. Russian sailors were 
6Suzanne Massie, Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia (New York: Simon and 
Shuster, 1980), 14-15. 
4 
feted at grand parties and dinners up and down the East Coast. Alexander's freeing of the 
serfs. virtually coincided with Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. There was burst of 
romantic pro-Russian sentiment that lasted for some years, further inspired by the poetry of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Walt Whitman. The purchase of Alaska in 1867 was facilitated 
by an amiable relationship between Secretary of State William Seward and the Russian 
minister in Washington, along with Russian bribes of some well-selected Congressmen who 
had disparaged Alaska as "Seward's Folly" and "Walrussia." 
It would take a fantastic imagination to trace the causes of the Cold War to the 18th or 
19th centuries. Yet in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville did imagine just such a rivalry in his 
Democracy in America. These two emerging powers, he wrote, "have suddenly placed 
themselves in the front rank among the nations" and seem "marked out by the will of Heaven 
to sway the destinies of half the globe."7 
There was some political skirmishing after the U.S. emerged from the Spanish-American 
War as an Asian and Pacific power, especially as the dubious Open Door Policy clashed with 
Russian expansionism in Northeast Asia; But Theodore Roosevelt's settlement of the Russo­
Japanese War on terms more favorable to Russia than to Japan was gratifying to the Russians 
(and infuriating to the Japanese). 
Perhaps the -most important pre-1917 happening was the migration of more than three 
million Russian subjects to the United States between 1881 and 1917. Tsarist repression and 
pogroms (including the mass killings of Jews) predisposed many Americans to favor a 
Russian revolution. Thousands of emigre socialists organized trade unions which became 
adjuncts to both Democratic and Socialist parties, founded journals of social philosophy, and 
taught in the burgeoning social science departments of urban universities. (In later years of 
Red Scares and McCarthyism, some of these escapees from Russian tyranny became victims 
of American witch hunts.) 
Still it must be said that in all the interaction between Russia and America before 1917, 
there were no vital conflicts of interest or disastrous turning points that made enmity 
inevitable. It is the Russian remembrance of that history and the American forgetfulness of 
it that makes it a moral dimension of our present relations. 
4. The Moral Legacy of the Russian Revolution and the U.S. 
Response 
On April 3, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson went before Congress to ask for a 
declaration of war against Germany. It was less than three weeks after the overthrow of the 
7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Phillips Bradley Edition (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1956), vol. 1, 452. 
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Russian monarchy. Wilson's address was ecstatic in hailing "the great, generous Russian 
people" who "in all their naive majesty and might" had been added to "the forces that are 
fighting for freedom in the word, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a 
league of honor."8 
So there might have been a partnership between revolutionary Russia and the United 
States. Even after the second round of revolution eight months later, that of the Bolsheviks, 
Wilson was conspicuously solicitous for the new Soviet government. In the sixth of his 
Fourteen Points set for the January 1918, he pleaded for acceptance of Soviet self­
determination, "a sincere welcome into the society of free nations," and assistance "of every 
kind" from "her sister nations."9 
The U.S. and its allies did not respond positively, however, to Lenin's Decree on Peace, 
calling for an immediate armistice and issued on the very first day of the Bolshevik triumph. 
That pointless and pitiless war of attrition ground on for another year without any serious 
effort at a political settlement. In the meantime, as civil war broke out in Russia in mid-
1918, Wilson was persuaded by the British and French to dispatch U.S. marines to Murmansk 
and thousands of soldiers to Archangel and Vladivostok -- ostensibly to protect Allied 
munitions and a Czech legion that had defected from the Austrian army and proposed to join 
the allies. When U.S. troops remained on Russian territory long after the November I I ,  19 17  
armistice, their implication in Allied efforts to  overthrow the Soviet government became a 
very serious matter, leading to battle with the Red Army and over 500 U.S. casualties. The 
last U.S. troops did not leave Russia until April 1920. 
Here begins, then, a long list of "what-ir' moments in U.S.-Soviet relations: moments 
when other decisions and policies on both sides might have prevented the abyss of distrust. 
What if World War I had ended in 1917 instead of 1918? What if the U.S. had not been 
misguided into invading Russian territory? 
The aftermath of World War I and the Russian Revolution offered many more such 
moments. 
What if the Allies had not excluded both Russia and Germany from the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919, thus denying them both a stake in the peace settlements - - terms which 
proved to be prime causes of an even more terrible war just twenty years later? 
What if Wilson had not inexplicably refused to receive William C. Bullitt, his own 
emissary, back from a mission to Lenin in March 1919, returning from Moscow with a 
8Woodrow Wilson, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1917, Supplement 
l, The World War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), 200. 
9Woodrow Wilson, quoted in George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American 
Relations. 1917-1920 (Princeton University Press, 1956), 27. 
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provisional agreement to end the Russian civil war and Allied intervention and to provide 
amnesty for Russians who had aided the Allies? 
What if the generous Hoover food mission to Russia in 1921-22, which saved millions of 
Russian lives from starvation, had been followed with diplomatic recognition instead of 
Herbert Hoover's own demands that the Soviets "abandon their present economic system"? 
Virtually all the governments of Europe recognized the Soviet government by 1924. The 
U.S., righteously refused until Franklin Roosevelt announced recognition in November 1933. 
Roosevelt's climactic conversations with Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov included a strange 
and amusing homily. FDR said: 
Now you know, Max, your good old father and mother, pious Jewish people, always 
said their prayers . . . .  Now you may think you're an atheist .. but I tell you Max, when 
you die do you know what you're going to think of? You're going to be thinking 
about what your father and mother taught you . . . . That's all I ask,  Max--to have 
Russia recognize freedom of religion.10 
If Lenin's contempt for religion was originally balanced by a strategic concern not to 
alienate all religious support of the Revolution, the militant alliance of the Orthodox 
Hierarchy with anti-Soviet forces in the civil war led to the deaths of many bishops and 
priests and to an increasingly repressive state policy. Nicholas Berdyaev, the great Russian 
Orthodox theologian-philosopher who was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1922, 
acknowledged a quarter-century later that "the militant godlessness of the communist 
Revolution" was largely due to the failure of Christianity to "carry out its mission for the 
transfiguration of life" and to Orthodoxy's slavish "support of an order which was based upon 
wrong and oppression."11 
Whatever Lenin's ambiguous legacy concerning religion, Stalin's persecutions and virtual 
shutdown of the churches matched his brutal collectivization of agriculture and mass purges 
which cost untold millions of lives. Soviet commentators have recently acknowledged that 
the horrors of Stalinism were partly responsible for the West's hostility in the Cold War -­
a long-overdue note of ambiguity on the Soviet side. Yet there was an immense investment 
of social idealism and sacrifice in the early years of the Soviet Revolution which stirred 
millions to lift their poor and backward country above the miseries of previous generations. 
Perhaps nothing more tragically requires an ethics of ambiguity than the fate of the 
Weimar Republic, Germany's brief experience of democratic, libertarian government between 
1918 and 1932.  It was the unwitting collusion between Stalin's nihilist strategy to wreck 
10Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1985), 397-98. 
11Nicholas Berdyaev, The Russian Idea, trans. R.M. French (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 247-
48. 
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democratic socialism in Germany, on one hand, and the export of the American Depression 
that wiped out Germany's lower middle class, thus providing Nazism with its prime political 
base, on the other hand, that ushered Hitler into power. 
Even then, had the United States belonged to the League of Nations, or at least been 
prepared to join in collective resistance to Nazi aggression, as urged most forcefully by the 
Soviet Union, the moral balance might have been righted. Stalin's strange 1939 pact with 
Hitler, at once cynical and naive, might have been precluded. 
Many Western liberals believed in 1936 and after that the last chance to stop the march 
of Fascism was in the Spanish Civil War. A Congressional embargo on arms to Spain (arms 
that might have enabled the Republican government to survive) was strongly supported by 
the American Catholic hierarchy. On the March day in 1939 that Franco's army marched into 
Madrid, Pope Pius XII sent Franco a message thanking God for the Fascist victory in 
"Catholic Spain." There was a double-tragedy for foreigners who had fought on the 
Republican side and survived. American liberals and socialists were later victims of 
McCarthyism in the Cold War, while Russians who had been dispatched to Spain by Stalin 
and become imbued with democratic ideals returned home to become special victims of 
Stalin's purges and exterminations. 
If the Cold War's most immediate causes are to be traced to the context of World War II 
and its aftermath, then the moral accountability for the events leading up to World War II 
becomes a central issue for the ethics of history. The demons of Nazism developed in large 
part from the sins of other nations. 
5. Responsibility for the Cold War 
Somehow, in ways still disputed by historians and politicians, U.S.-Soviet relations in the 
1940s moved from wartime alliance and the promotions of friendship between our two 
peoples to a near half -century of enmity, apocalypticized by the threat of mutual 
annihilation. I recently acquired a video of a 1943 War Department propaganda film that 
offered a glorified account of Russian history and heroism in the war against Hitler. Some 
of that film's pro-Russian sentimentalities are almost embarrassing even today in a time of 
renewed detente. 
One persuasive account of the Cold War's origins begins not with Stalin's violations of 
Yalta Conference principles in Eastern Europe, but back two years earlier. In January 1943, 
Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met in Casablanca and announced their wartime 
goal of "unconditional surrender"--partly to persuade Stalin, whose armies were then 
embattled at Stalingrad, that the Western allies would wage total war against Hitler without 
an appeasing settlement. Louis Halle, a State Department official in the 1940's judged that 
8 
the policy of unconditional surrender "laid the foundations-of the Cold War" by eliminating 
German power from Central Europe.12 
Both a prime cause and the most serious consequence of the dogma of unconditional 
surrender was the compulsion to demonize the enemies. That meant the righteous incapacity 
to recognize that there were either "good Germans" or early prospects for an armistice with 
Japan that would preclude the use of A-bombs. 
If Halle's thesis is correct, we then confront one of the most terrible ironies of the 
twentieth century. A supremely tough, militant, no-compromise, fight-to-the-finish 
wartime policy for the sake (it was said) of an enduring peace, set the stage for both the Cold 
War in Europe and the nuclear arms race. 
It is surely more than a minor footnote to recall in this context the efforts of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, on behalf of an impressive corps of anti-Hitler resistance leaders, to persuade 
the Allies to consider an early peace, given a successful overthrow of Hitler. We are left with 
another haunting "what-ir': wondering what the shape of Europe and of U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
relations might have become after 1945 if Bonhoeffer and Anglican Bishop George Bell had 
been taken more seriously by Allied governments. 
There were many other decisional moments in the later stages of the war, and the months 
just after, that stepped up the momentum of antagonism: the abrupt cancellation of Lend­
Lease aid to the Russians and the refusal to comply with a Russian request for a $6 billion 
reconstruction loan; U.S. secretiveness about the A-bomb and then implicit brandishing of 
the bomb against the Russians; Stalin's engineering of a coup in Czechoslovakia after the 
Czechs' democratic government decided to participate in the Marshall Plan. The Berlin 
· Blockade of 1948-49 led directly to the formation of NATO -- and military alliances 
increasingly defined Cold War relationships. 
In subsequent years, the prospects for detente were repeatedly frustrated by secondary 
aspects of the Cold War: 
*proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Central America; 
*the Paris Summit of 1960 undone by U-2 overflights; 
*the planned beginning of nuclear arms talks in 1968, disastrously postponed by the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia; 
*the promise of SALT I, broken by the Nixon administration's decision to deploy MIRVs 
(thus forsaking the opportunity to stabilize the nuclear parity of the superpowers and 
bedeviling all subsequent arms negotiations; 
*Soviet interventions in Angola and the Horn of Africa; 
12Louis Halle, �he Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 36. 
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*the 1976 presidential primary campaign of Ronald Reagan, which led the Ford White 
House to abandon the virtually completed SAlt II Treaty and even to abandon the very word 
"detente" -- after which U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations were plunged into a decade of regression to 
some of the worst of Cold War animosities and military escalations . 
If the causes of the Cold War and its perpetuation remain morally ambiguous and 
debatable, the causes of its seeming denouement are no less so. Should the credit go to 
Ronald Reagan and his aggressive "peace through strength" policies? Or to Mikhail 
Gorbachev and his visionary "new thinking" and relentless diplomatic initiatives? Or to the 
unprecedented anti-nuclear movements of the 1980's. Or to the magisterial engagement of 
church hierarchies in these issues? Or to Nancy Reagan and her astrologer? And what shall 
we say of the remarkable achievements of the disciplined nonviolent demonstrations that 
recently toppled the communist regimes of Eastern Europe? Was the spirit of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. alive in them? 
How we read the histories of such events tends to be influential in shaping our ethical 
orientations to East-West relations and our policy prescriptions for the future. The public 
policy struggles of our time have increasingly been fought over alternative readings of 
history. 
6.  Truthfulness and Enmity 
Hans Ki.ing's 1968 essay on Truthfulness: The Future of the Church lamented that, 
historically, there had been a "sweeping disregard of truthfulness in moral theology." 
Truthfulness had not been classed as either a theological virtue or one of the cardinal virtues. 
At best, it was subsumed under some other virtue; so Thomas Aquinas subsumed it under 
justice.13 
Whatever the defaults of moral theologians, the virtue of truthfulness has been very hard 
to come by in U.S.-Soviet relations. The Cold War has been waged with vicious strategies 
of disinformation on both sides. For many years, anti-American propaganda in Soviet 
rhetoric and media (not least from Soviet "peace" groups) has been outrageously crude. ru 
the problem of truthfulness is hardly one-sided. George Kennan has exposed the 
"primitivism" of American propaganda against the U.S.S.R.: its "endless series of distortions 
and oversimplifications," its "systematic dehumanization" of Soviet leadership, its "routine 
exaggeration" of Soviet military capabilities, its "monotonous misrepresentation" of the Soviet 
13Hans Ki.ing, Truthfulness: The Future of the Church (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968),  23. 
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people, and its "reckless application of the double standard to the judgment of Soviet conduct 
and our own."14 
The investigation of this deficiency of truthfulness requires a historical methodology and 
particular cases. A decisively pernicious myth that gained ground in the late 1970s and 
became the dominant policy presumption of the 1980s held that the Soviets had achieved (or 
were about to achieve) nuclear superiority, while the U.S. had allegedly neglected its nuclear 
forces during the 1970s. That fabrication of recent history ignored the fact that the U.S. 
added more than 5 ,000 strategic nuclear weapons during the 1970s and multiplied potential 
missile targets in the Soviet Union from 1700 to about 9,000 - largely through the MIRVing 
of both land-based and sub-based missiles. All this, while pushing ahead with all the new 
missile technologies: Mark 12-A warheads, Tridents I and II, Pershing lis, MX, air-launched 
cruise missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles. 
There is a more complicated aspect to the deficiency of truthfulness, especially in 
connection with the arms race: the twisted logics and the ground-shiftings involved in the 
endless rationalizations and proliferation of very moralistic arguments for promoting new 
"generations" of nuclear weapons and resisting arms reductions. Just one example: The 
Strategic Defense Initiative was originally presented as a project to make nuclear weapons 
"impotent and obsolete," to overcome that "immoral" policy of nuclear deterrence. But then 
the moral argument flipflopped when the overwhelming skepticism of scientists was 
registered. Now SDI was billed as just the system to "enhance deterrence" -- and deterrence 
was once more a Good Thing, not the Bad Thing that SDI would abolish. 
Christian ethicists may not sit in expert judgment on all such technologies. But we may, 
and must, discern the moral arguments and the political justifications for such technologies 
and the foreign and military policies they are supposed to serve. That means tracking the 
history of moral rhetoric in U.S.-Soviet relations. 
7. Comparative Political Ethos 
There is a largely unexamined moral paradox in any serious comparative study of the 
political cultures of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. One side of the paradox is to discover how 
radically different are the historical experiences and cultural backgrounds of the superpowers 
-- a great gulf that rightly discourages sentimental expectations of political harmony between 
them. The contrasts typically drawn by Americans between the values of the two political 
cultures - - their ethoses -- have focused on the presumed polarities of freedom vs. 
authoritarianism (or security), of individualism vs. collectivism, of spirituality vs. 
14George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1983),  197.  
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materialism. There are at least half -truths in these contrasts, such as conflicting priorities 
between American and Soviet conceptions of human rights -- but the polarities have been 
overdrawn as descriptions of empirical values. 
The other side of the paradox is the surprising discovery that there are many parallels and 
affinities between the superpowers -- affinities that offer potentials for both concord and 
intense conflict, conflict not only between them but also threatening to engulf many other 
nations. 
As presumptuous "superpowers," both nations exude not only a historic mystique of 
gigantism and invincibility: their nuclear prowess (which they jointly try to deny to others) 
makes them implicit imperialists toward all other nations. Both have a mystical sense of 
destiny, of messianic identity. Both have celebrated the robust ethic of the frontier and have 
had the space and the wilderness to practice it. Both have ritualized ideologies of equality 
but offer rationalizations for increasing inequalities. Both have anti-governmental and anti­
militarist ideologies -- but both have strong statist governments and enormous military 
establishments. Both have worshipped at the shrines of technolatry, for which they have 
sacrificed community and environmental values. Both have inspired the grossest of 
materialistic values. Whether their common religious faiths and common hopes for peace 
and a more abundant life will yet provide the bonds of mutual respect and concordant 
relationships is an open question for the last years of this millennium. 
8. The Christian Critique of Marxist-Leninist Ideology 
The Christian-Marxist dialogue which enjoyed a brief flurry in Central Europe in the 
1960s and has been a major topic in Latin American liberation theology has never had a vital 
counterpart in the Soviet Union. Quite apart from the political barriers to such a dialogue 
within the U.S.S.R. is the question as to whether there is really an integrated body of political 
and economic thought called "Marxism-Leninism." That is very much to be doubted. 
Michael Harrington's 1972 classic, Socialism, persuasively breaks apart those two terms, 
interpreting the mature Marx as one committed to evolutionary, democratic social change, 
while Lenin's political philosophy of elitist, conspiratorial revolution owes more to the 
writings of Russian fanatics of the 1870s.15 To be sure, Lenin shared Marx's materialistic 
philosophy and contempt for religion. But their divergence in political philosophy makes 
both Soviet claims and conservative critiques of "Marxism-Leninism" suspect. 
Perhaps even more important is the judgment of many Sovietologists that the professed 
ideology of "Marxism-Leninism" today is simply not a prime motivator of Soviet policy, 
having been reduced to the rituals of official rhetoric and now, under Mikhail Gorbachev, 
15Michael Harrington, Socialism (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), Chapter IV. 
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having lost almost all of its dialectical pyrotechnics -- especially in foreign policy where the 
appeal is to the morality of a common humanity. One apparent reason for the growth spurt 
in U.S.S.R. churches is their implicit offer, especially to young people, of a counter-culture 
to a decaying ideology. 
It has always been a serious moral error to make the atheism of both Marx and Lenin the 
major pretext of Christian anti-Sovietism: a pretext which excused too many Christians from 
apprehending the moral earnestness of Marx and many of his disciples, from concretely 
understanding Russian history and culture, and from discovering the immense reality of 
Russian Christianity. 
9. The Role of Christianity in Promoting Enmity 
That some Christian churches, theologians, evangelists, and conspicuously Christian laity 
have intensified the Cold War is a fact well-known to Christians and others in the Soviet 
Union. The Vatican's decades-long crusade against all forms of communism and socialism 
was given a firm platform by Pope Pius XI's encyclical, Divini Redemptoris, and fervent 
support by the American hierarchy until Pope John XXIII's 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris. 
(I have been wondering how certain departed cardinals from the Archdioceses of New York, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles might have responded to the spectacle of a Soviet president 
meeting the Holy Father at the Vatican.)  
Protestant fundamentalists and others have long been inflamed by the Manichaean anti­
communist preachings of "evangelical" celebrities. A recent example is Edmund Robb, 
proprietor of the Ed Robb Evangelistic Association and founder and board chairman of the 
Institute on Religion and Democracy. Robb's 1986 book, The Betrayal of the Church, 
castigates denominational mission and social action boards, Roman Catholic bureaucrats, and 
the National World councils of churches for providing "a public relations front for the Soviet 
Union" and identifying themselves with "totalitarians."16 Much closer to the heart of the 
Protestant mainline in the 1940s and 1950s was John Foster Dulles -- "Mr. Ch_ristian Layman" 
and the son of a Presbyterian preacher - whose rhetoric and policies as Secretary of State 
personified the ideological Cold War against "atheistic communism." 
In reviewing the regressive American political climate of the 1980s, ethicists would do 
well to assess the relative influence of Christian groups seeking to reinvigorate the Cold War 
and those seeking to overcome it. 
16Edmund W. Robb and Julia Robb, The Betrayal of the Church: Apostasy and Renewal in the 
Mainline Denominations (Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1986), 13, 17-18, 22, 38, 93, 207. 
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1 0. The Role of Ecumenism in Overcoming Enmity 
Ecc1esial relations between U.S. and Soviet churches since the 1950s have inevitably been 
preoccupied with issues of peace and justice. In the World Council of Churches, bilateral 
relations between the National Council of Churches and U.S.S.R. churches, denominational 
exchanges, and the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference, U.S.-Soviet ecumenism has 
been inescapably political. It has been marked by spirited controversy among participants, 
severe condemnation from outsiders, and the intrusiveness of both the KGB and the FBI. 
Since the 1979 "Choose Life" Consultation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. church leaders in Geneva, 
there has emerged a "confluent theology": a special testimony formed by the coming together 
of radically different streams of Christian history and experience into a common reservoir 
of conviction and spirituality. Among the emergent themes are these: (1) the recovery of a 
theology of Creation; (2) radical responsibility for history; (3) the security of shalom; (4) the 
idolatry of nuclear arms; (5) overcoming principalities and powers; (6) Christ, the Conqueror 
of Death; and (7) our unity in Christ. All these themes are loaded with ethical implications. 
The marvelous European Ecumenical Assembly in Basel in May 1 989 (an event still to 
be discovered in our North American churches) especially lifted up the radiant testimony of 
Russian Orthodoxy to the harmony between humanity and nature in God's Good Creation. 
Archbishop Kirill of Smolensk, former rector of the Leningrad Theological Academy, 
devoted his keynote address to proclaiming a theocentric ethic based on God as Creator: an 
ethic which teaches "wholeness, inter-connectedness and the value of the whole Creation 
(whose one purpose is) the glorification of the Creator."1 7 
The discovery that North American ethicists have much to learn from the ethics of our 
longtime enemies -- in fact, our Christian sisters and brothers from whom we have been so 
long estranged -- is surely a promising new point of departure for the enrichment and 
empowerment of us all. 
1 7 Archbishop Kirill of Smolensk, "Reconciliation in Europe-- Heritage and Vision--The Ecology 
of the Spirit," address at European Ecumenical Assembly, Basel, May 15, 1989 (unpublished 
manuscript). 
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